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Behaviour in therapeutic medical care - evidence from 
general practitioners in Austria 
Abstract  
Aim The present study examines monetary effects of general practioners’ behaviour 
in therapeutic medical care to identify sample characteristics that allow differentiating 
between the individual general practitioner and the basic population.  
Subjects and methods Medical services, provided by 3919 general practitioners in 
Austria, were operationalized by means of the dependent variable “costs per patient”. 
Statistical outliers were identified using Chebyshev's inequality and categorized by 
investigating bivariate correlations between the dependent variable and the personal 
characteristics of each physician.  
Results Variables that relate to the size of the customer base, such as number of 
consultations (r = 0.385) and office days (r = 0.376), correlate positively with the 
costs for medical services.  
By analyzing the portfolio of the general practitioners, we found a correlation of 0.451 
between this co-efficient and the costs. Statistical outliers feature an average 
portfolio of 44.5 different services, compared to 30.45 among non-outliers. Especially 
laboratory services were identified as cost drivers (r = 0.408). Statistical outliers 
generate at least one laboratory parameter for 44.34% of their patients, opposed to 
27.2 % within the rest of the sample. Consequently outliers produce higher laboratory 
costs than their counterparts.  
Conclusion We found some evidence that physicians have influence in the provision 
of their services. Considering entrepreneurial objectives the extension of the portfolio 
can increase their profit. Our findings indicate supplier-induced demand for several 
groups of services. We assume that the effect is consolidated by the fee for service 
system and could be compensated by adequate reform.  
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Abbreviations 
supplier-induced demand (SID), general practitioner (GP), therapeutic medical 
services (TMS) 
Introduction 
In primary care, general practitioners (GPs) represent the first point of contact for 
people with illness issues, who determine the diagnosis and advise their clients 
regarding the adequate treatment (Statistik Austria 2006; Knox and Britt 2004; Smits 
et al. 2009). Because of their steering function in the health care system, GPs are 
often referred to as gatekeepers who regulate and control the demand for medical 
services (Toon 1994).  
They decide whether the service of another colleague or discipline is inevitable or if 
their portfolio is sufficient enough to induce the recovery of the patient. The personal 
portfolio can basically be classified into the prescription of pharmaceuticals and the 
autonomous delivery of medical services, where the latter represents the doctor’s 
income. As e.g. in Germany and Austria outpatient therapeutical medical care is 
financed by social insurance institutions and therefore consumers rarely control the 
generated quantities, health economists assume that doctors have the ability to 
create demand for their services (Peacock and Richardson 2007; Fuchs 1978). This 
phenomenon is referred to as supplier-induced demand (SID), which implies that the 
producer of medical services defines the degree of his capacity utilization according 
to his own preferences - including his salary requirements - without the basic market 
forces regulating the transaction (Richardson 2001; Freebairn 2001). 
 
The model is based on a study by Evans (1974), who analyzed the financial situation 
of physicians in outpatient therapeutic medical care under the assumption that the 
income not only depends on the actual demand for medical services, but also on the 
providers’ preferences. One of the most recognized publications in this field was 
presented by Fuchs in 1978. He reported direct association between the physician 
density per capita and the number of therapeutic medical services (TMS) performed. 
In his sample a 10% rise in surgeon positions increased the demand for surgeries by 
3%. In absolute numbers each additional position in the particular region would imply 
an increase of between 40-60 surgeries per year (Fuchs 1978).  
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 3 
Other studies since the late 1970s have advanced the theoretical and empirical 
knowledge of SID, which in the USA is also referred to as physician-induced demand 
PID (Green 1978; Auster and Oaxaca 1981; Freebairn 2001). Most of the research 
refers to the fact that the personal income is an important determinant in the 
physician’s utility function and a shift in doctor’s advice to more expensive medical 
treatment can be autonomously induced by the providers.  
However, the monetary effect of SID was discussed by Stano, who assumes that SID 
could only occur in monopolistic markets, since the effect can never compensate for 
the loss in earnings if the market is saturated (Stano 1987). 
 
There is a controversial debate on the view if SID is a phenomenon of self-interest of 
the physicians, emphasizing the doctor’s role as an agent who has to preserve the 
patient’s interests (Rossiter and Wilensky 1984). In this context the dual capacity of 
the GPs causes some reason for doubt. On the one hand they represent trusted 
advisers in health matters of their clients, but on the other hand they operate as 
entrepreneurs who can benefit from excessive supply (Breyer and Zweifel 2004). 
This antagonism is enhanced by the information asymmetry between the 
protagonists, with the less informed patients delegating health care desicions to the 
doctors. This behaviour remains unproblematic as long as the latter serve as perfect 
agents, without pursuing opportunistic interests.  
Based on the present state of research in the field of SID and under the assumption 
that physicians who operate in a social health care system have to economize when 
choosing the adequate treatment for their patients, the main objective of the present 
study is to analyze the behaviour in outpatient therapeutic medical care.  
According to the above-discussed literature, the aim of the present study is to answer 
the question if GPs providing excessive medical services can be identified. It will be 
evaluated to what extent miscellaneous individual characteristics of physicians have 
an impact on their behaviour by using the example of Austrian GPs and the medical 
services they generated during the year of 2008.  
Methodology 
The present study uses data from an national social insurance institution from 3,919 
GPs nationwide in the year 2008. The cooperating institution represents the social 
insurance company for the self-employed in Austria, with a customer base of 461,301 
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insurants. In Austria approximately 6,400 GPs work in private practice, with 4,367 
GPs being under contract with the cooperating social insurance institution.1 The 
dataset only includes doctors who provide medical attendance during the entire year, 
excluding those who went out of business or started operations during that period. 
During the observation period 2,903,820 consultations were conducted that 
accounted for € 59,477,598.  
After the selection of the outliers their personal characteristics are to be detected. 
The objectives require the identification of all statistical outliers in the following 
category, which also represents the dependent variable (DV):  
DV = Total expenditure per patient for TMS provided  
In calculating the outliers, we take into account that there is a strong linear 
relationship between the costs for medical services and the number of patients 
treated. The graph which describes the relationship runs through the zero point and 
has an inclination that represents the proportionality constant. The proportionality 
constant equates to the average costs per TMS, calculated over the total sample of 
3,919 GPs.  
b = total costs / total number of patients  
 
With the proportionality constant the estimated costs for each GP are calculated by 
the formula: 
estimated costs = b * number of patients 
 
We use the distribution of the deviations of the actual costs per patient from the 
estimated costs to define a statistical outlier: 
 
An outlier is a physician, whose discrepancy between actual and estimated 
costs for medical services exceeds the 90 % percentile of the distribution of 
the discrepancies of all physicians with the same number of patients.  
 
To determine the limit that has to be exceeded in order to be identified as an 
statistical outlier we apply Chebyshev's inequality, which reads as follows (Fisz 
1971): 
                                            
1 Standesmeldung Österr. Ärztekammer, Juni 2010 
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If X is a random variable X with a second order finite moment E(X2) < ∞, then for 
every constant c>0 holds: P(IXI c)  E(X2) /c2 . In our case X represents the deviation 
of the actual costs from the estimated costs.  
 
+++insert figure 1+++ 
Fig. 1 Chebyshev's inequality 
 
This inequality has the advantage to be a very conservative method to determine 
outliers, since it only identifies outliers whose actual costs deviate dramatically from 
the estimated cost. Moreover no estimation for the special kind of the distribution 
(e.g. normal distribution) is needed for the calculation, since the method only requires 
an estimation for the second order finite moment of the distribution, which can be 
calculated from the empirical data. After determination of the numerical value of P(IXI 
 c) the inequality can be resolved to c. 
Typology of the outliers  
In the attempt to categorize outliers according to their behaviour in therapeutic 
medical care we investigate bivariate correlations between the statistical outliers and 
the following independent variables: 
a. Regional population  
b. Physician density – number of GPs per community 
c. Gender of the physician 
d. Age of the physician 
e. Dimensions of the medical practice measured by the patient frequency 
(office days, number of consultations)  
f. Number of medical services 
g. Portfolio of medical services 
h. Quantity of services and costs in the field of laboratory medicine 
 
These tested variables have no obvious relationship with the health status of the 
physician’s patients.  
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Results 
The primary focus of this study is to evaluate the role of the GP in the demand for 
medical services by statistically analyzing his behaviour irrespective of the patient’s 
health status. Table 1 presents an overview of the correlation between the relevant 
variables. The strong correlation between the patient quantity and the costs (r=.71) 
confirms our decision to use the average costs per patient as the dependent variable 
to identify statistical outliers. 
 
+++insert table 1+++ 
Table 1 Overview of the relevant variables  
 
Within the sample a total of 437,532 patients were treated, who consulted their GPs 
2,903,820 times during the year 2008 and received a total number of 6,576,830 
services, which amounted to € 59,477,598. Based on the numerical value per patient 
(€ 135.94), the anticipated cost for each physician and the deviation from the actual 
costs can be calculated. The application of Chebyshev's inequality shows a 
significant deviation from the estimate in 148 cases. In other words, the treatment 
expenses of 148 GPs, measured by the deviation of the actual costs per patient from 
the estimated costs, exceed the rest of the sample significantly. In this subsample of 
148 statistical outliers the total sum of costs above the extimated costs amounts to € 
2,238,777.90. 
 
Now we intend to contain the statistical outliers by explaining their behaviour in 
therapeutic medical care with criteria or a combination of criteria that are 
characteristic for the physician.  
 
We found correlations between the dependent variable (costs per patient) and all 
variables that relate to the patient frequency (office days, number of consultations). 
The correlations vary between 0.376 (office days) and 0.385 (consultations). This 
indicates that the doctor’s income is dependent on the size of his customer base and 
the magnitude of the demand for his services. That assumption is confirmed by the 
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 7 
following findings: Outliers have significantly more office days and a larger number of 
consultations than subjects that do not exhibit these attributes (Tab. 2).  
 
+++insert table 2+++ 
Table 2 Office Days 
 
+++insert table 3+++ 
Table 3 Consultations 
 
The probability that an outlier is identified within group 2 is nine times higher that 
within the group with less capacity. In this and all following contingency tables “group 
2” contains the physicians whose value in the independent variable exceeds the 
upper limit of the so-called 2-sigma-range. Group 1 contains the rest of the sample. 
 
Between the criterion ”population“ and the dependent variable we found a negative 
correlation of -0.241, indicating that physicians who produce more quantity are likely 
to be located in regions with a smaller population. Additionally, we compare 
physicians from the two biggest municipal regions (Vienna and Graz) with the rest of 
the sample (Tab 3).  
 
+++insert table 4+++ 
Table 4 Population 
 
As expected we found significantly more outliers outside the two municipal areas. 
The probability to identify an outlier in a rural region is twice as high as finding one in 
a municipal area. In contrast the physician density, which represents a common 
feature of many SID studies, could not be detected as a variable of relevant influence 
within the sample. 
When analyzing the quantity of medical services, the data provides evidence for an 
appreciable correlation between the number of medical services produced by the 
physician and the costs (r = 0.425). The outliers show an average of 2098.39 
therapeutic services annually, compared to 1131.09 services for the rest of the 
sample. The dichotomous analysis verifies the results, since the group of physicians 
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 8 
that produces more quantity contains 7 times more outliers than the other group (Tab 
4).  
 
+++insert table 5+++ 
Table 5 Number of services 
 
Considering the fee structure for medical services, the findings seem to be trivial, 
since prices are fixed and basically the quantity regulates the costs. However, we 
decided to assess the subject more extensively by focusing on the physicians’ 
individual portfolio. In this context we define the GP’s portfolio as the range of 
medical services, measured by the number of different services according to the 
current fee structure. The correlation between the dependent variable and the 
criterion ”portfolio“ is 0.451. The mean comparison indicates that outliers (44.51 
different services) have a greater portfolio than their peers (30.45 different services). 
The dichotomous analysis is highly significant and supports the results (Tab 8).  
 
+++insert table 6+++ 
Table 6 Portfolio  
 
We continued by investigating if a group of services might induce this trend 
exceptionally and found a positive correlation (r = 0.408) between the number of 
laboratory services and the dependent variable.  
On average statistical outliers provide 433.96 laboratory services compared to 
148.32 services by their peers. The evaluation of the laboratory costs featured a 
corresponding result (Tab. 6, 7).  
 
+++insert table 7+++ 
Table 7 Number of laboratory services 
 
+++insert table 8+++ 
Table 8 Costs of laboratory services 
 
Finally we focused on the criterion ”laboratory services“ to investigate possible 
differences between the statistical outliers and non-outliers in this area: 
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The mean value of the annual costs for laboratory services per physician within the 
group of outliers is € 4,013.46 (standard deviation 3,516) compared to € 1,453,20 
(standard deviation 1,834.27) with non-outliers. The costs for laboratory services per 
patient reveal a similar result. In the group of outliers the annual costs per patient 
average € 90.75 (standard deviation 57.64) compared to € 40.21 (standard deviation 
34.28) with non outliers.  
 
+++insert table 9+++ 
Table 9 Key data for laboratory services 
 
The laboratory quota represents the percentage of patients who receive a laboratory 
test during the consultation of their GP. Outliers perform at least one or more tests 
per year for 44.34% (standard deviation 14.13%) of their patients, opposed to 
27.82% (standard deviation 11.68%) among their counterparts. Since every 
laboratory parameter contributes to the GP’s income we calculated the share of 
laboratory revenue of the total revenue. The percentage of the physician’s income 
that can be attributed directly to laboratory services is on average 14.24% (standard 
deviation 9.31%) in the group of outliers and 9.16% (standard deviation 12.08%) 
amongst other providers. 
 
Considering the final two criteria of our study, neither the variable age of the 
physician nor gender had a significant influence on the costs per patient.  
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Discussion 
In Austria, outpatient therapeutic medical care is disbursed on a “fee for service” 
basis (§ 28 Honorarordung). With the exception of a few capped positions, the 
doctor’s income correlates positively with the number of services provided for his 
clients and consequently with the number of consultations. This type of remuneration 
system does not use the medical output in terms of “production of health” to 
determine the net income of the provider. Therefore, an economical and considerate 
use of the resources is not necessarily required. Through its monetary incentives the 
modality of payment for medical attendance determines not only the costs of health 
care but also the effectiveness of the system. In general, effectiveness can be 
described by the capability of the selected procedure to achieve the objective – in our 
case the recovery of the patient.  
Accordingly, GPs are expected to (Devlin and Sarma 2008; Newhouse 1996): 
- supply as many patients as possible with TMS and to be continuously 
available for their clients  
- offer a wide range of medical services to meet the individual 
requirements of their patients 
- establish a personal doctor-patient relationship with all customers 
without discriminating against high-risk groups 
The “fee for service” system meets these requirements (Rice 1997; Devlin and 
Sarma 2008). Physicians who provide a sizable clientele with a maximum of services 
are rewarded, sanctioning those who accomplish less quantity (Robinson 2001). Our 
study supports the assumption that the size of the customer base and the frequency 
they demand for doctor’s advice is the biggest cost driver in therapeutic medical care. 
The findings are comprehensible and inherent to the current remuneration system. In 
this context a few drawbacks of the fee for service approach should be mentioned: 
Neither the adequacy of the supplied services nor the enhancement of the 
population’s health status represent criteria for success (Hickson et al. 1987). Also 
interdisciplinary collaboration between the different groups of health care 
professionals is not promoted. Most of these shortfalls could be balanced by 
implementing alternative remuneration mechanisms such as “pay for perfomance” or 
“capitation”, which presently are not established in the Austrian health care system 
(Levaggi and Rochaix 2003).  
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Under the assumption that the behaviour of GPs in therapeutic medical care is also 
determined by personal requirements of the care provider, the theory of SID 
becomes a popular research area for health economics. As stated above, to be 
considered an inducement, the medical services should be of questionable value to 
the patient and primarily initiated for profit and not medical reasons (Bradford and 
Martin 1995). Eventually there also is a strong coherence between the system of 
remuneration for medical services and the likelihood of SID. Physicians who derive 
their income in a ”fee for service“ system have a 30% higher probability to initiate 
further consultations than their peers in ”capitation“ or ”pay for performance“ settings 
(Phelps 1997). The interdependency between SID and health care costs appears to 
be reasonable, since our current system measures the GP’s income in achieved 
quantities, whereas alternative approaches emphasize the outcome of the medical 
intervention. Against this background the steering function of the remuneration 
system becomes apparent.  
 
The results of our study provide some insight into the GP’s latitude when providing 
medical treatment. The tendency that physicians with extensive portfolios frequently 
exceed the costs indicates the occurence of SID within the sample. Statistical outliers 
feature on average 14 more services within their portfolio than physicians with a 
more economic behaviour. We assume that most of the effect can be attributed to the 
possibility to provide laboratory services. Considering the average laboratory costs 
per patient, the identified statistical outliers exceed the rest of the sample by 125%. 
Also the mean laboratory quota of 44.34% within the outlier group appears to be 
rather excessive, especially if you consider the GP to be more of a generalist and not 
necessarily a specialist for laboratory diagnostics. It is highly improbable that the 
disparities in the magnitude of conducted laboratory services can exclusively be 
attributed to the health status or active demand on behalf of the patients. Rather the 
qualification of the physician - and his opportunity to allocate activities - increases the 
supply. Consequently if a physician is permitted to procure a certain product range, 
he is capable of providing TMS irrespective of the actual demand.  
Our findings indicate the existence of SID – not necessarily for the occupational 
group collectively, not even for the individual GP’s full range of services, but more 
probably for several types of services. It seems appropiate that, especially in the field 
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of laboratory medicine, tests can be generated by the bulk using technical equipment 
without exceptionally affecting the scarce time resources of the physician. 
Considering the entrepreneurial objectives in a fee for service system, the expansion 
of the portfolio of TMS seems to be a common method to increase profit (Carrin and 
Van Dael 1984). The effect is however consolidated by the prevailing system of 
remuneration and could be absorbed by adequate reform. Reflecting the opening 
statement about the GP’s core competences and his particular importance to the 
health care system, alternative forms of payment that inhibit SID by compensating 
the GP ad valorem are inevitable.  
 
The following limitations of this study should be mentioned:  
The behaviour of the GPs was analyzed based on the available data. Since only the 
billing data of the national health insurance was accessible, the diagnoses of the 
patients and the form of therapy could not be evaluated. Therefore the study was 
conducted without consideration of the clients’ health status. Another critical point is 
the absent comprehensive survey reflecting on the interdependency between the 
medical services and the pharmaceuticals prescribed by the physicians. We assume 
that these factors are mutually dependent and would like to focus on that assumption 
in a follow-up study.  
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patient 
quantity 
office days consultations 
medical 
services 
quantity 
medical 
services 
costs 
laboratory 
services 
costs 
patient quantity   .61 .86 .79 .71 .50 
office days .61   .72 .69 .61 .43 
consultations .86 .72   .95 .84 .65 
medical services quantity .79 .69 .95   .86 .81 
medical services costs .71 .61 .84 .86   .66 
laboratory services costs .50 .43 .65 .81 .66   
Table 1 Overview of the relevant variables  
 
Tables 1-9
   non outliers outliers total 
group 1 3732 130 3862 
group 2  39 18 57 
total 3771 148 3919 
chi square 123.04 
mean  175.63 209.92   
Table 2 Office Days 
 
   non-outliers outliers total 
group 1 3636 127 3763 
group 2 135 21 156 
total 3771 148 3919 
chi square 41.94 
mean 536.54 882.22   
Table 3 Consultations 
 
 
   non-outliers outliers total   non-outliers outliers total 
Vienna 631 12 643 Vienna/Graz 770 15 765 
rest 3410 136 3276 rest 3021 133 3154 
total 3771 148 0 total 3771 148 3919 
chi square Jul 72 chi square Aug 62 
Table 4 Population 
 
   non-outliers outliers total 
group 1 3633 110 3743 
group 2 138 38 176 
total 3771 148 3919 
chi square 160.93 
mean 1131.09 2098.39   
Table 5 Number of services 
   non-outliers outliers total 
group 1 3668 130 3798 
group 2 103 18 121 
total 3771 148 3919 
chi square 42.33 
mean 30.45 44.51   
Table 6 Portfolio 
   non-outliers outliers total 
group 1 3633 110 3743 
group 2 138 38 176 
total 3771 148 3919 
chi square 160.93 
mean 148.32 433.96   
Table 7 Number of laboratory services 
 
 
   non-outliers outliers total 
group 1 3629 110 3739 
group 2 142 38 180 
total 3771 148 3919 
chi square 156.01 
mean 827.43 2434.46   
Table 8 Costs of laboratory services 
 
 
 
   outliers non outliers 
  mean standard deviation mean standard deviation 
total laboratory costs 4,013.46 3,516.00 1,453.20 1,834.27 
total laboratory services  707.53 602.47 259.87 325.56 
laboratory costs per patient 90.75 57.64 40.21 34.28 
laboratory quota 44.34% 14.13% 27.82% 11.68% 
income quota 14.24% 9.31% 9.16% 12.08% 
Table 9 Key data for laboratory services 
Figure 1
Click here to download high resolution image
List of changes 
 
1. Abstract: Should be shorter and focused on main contents/messages (150-
250 words)  
- Revision p.1: The number of words was reduced from 362 to 247 
 
2. Question: From the context of the manuscript it is not comprehensible if the 
number 3919 general practitioners is to be covered to Austria in total 
- Revision p.3 last break: The present study uses data from an Austrian 
national health insurance institution from 3919 GPs nationwide in the 
year 2008. In Austria approximately 6400 GPs work in private practice, 
with 4367 GPs being under contract with the social insurance 
institution. Physicians who did not provide services for the cooperating 
social insurance institution during the entire year of 2008 were excluded 
from the sample.    
 
3. Page 2 (Introduction), I.3: In Germany, medical services are predominantly 
paid by social insurance institutions but there are other resources like private 
health insurances and others. In fact, remuneration by private health 
insurances constitutes a very important source of income for GPs. 
- Author’s comment: The study does not include privately financed 
services of GPs. Within the group of GPs, who are under contract of a 
social insurance company, the vast majority of services are financed by 
the social insurance institutions. To some extent legal restrictions even 
prohibit this group of physicians to invoice private bills.   
In contrast within the group of GPs who are not under contract of a 
social insurance institution (Wahlärzte) all medical services are paid on 
the patient’s own account – and only if the patient files the invoice to his 
social insurance company, they reimburse 80% of the costs. However 
this group of GPs is not included in the sample.  
The financing of GP services through private insurance institutions is 
not a common method of remuneration on the Austrian market, since 
they predominantly focus on financing hospital services.  
4. Page 3, I.53: Maybe better: “It will be evaluated to what extent…” 
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5. Page 4, I.12/13: Sentence “According to the above-questioned literature, the 
aim…” fits better on page 3 between I.51 and 52/53 
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6. Question: Page 4, I.2: What kind of health insurance institution cooperated 
with you in order to conduct the study? In Germany, different health 
insurances exist with more or less different groups of insured people (differ for 
instance in age, socio-economic status, chronic diseases…) 
- Revision p.3/4: The cooperating institution represents the social 
insurance company for the self-employed, with a customer base of 
461,301 insurants. 
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